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Abstract
In bi-matrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolu-
tionary game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies
(ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-
qubit initial quantum states when a switch-over to a quantum version of
the game also changes the evolutionary stability of a mixed symmetric
Nash equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Quantum game theory has gained considerable interest recently. In a pioneering
work, Meyer [1] presented the idea of playing a quantum form of a sequential
game by unitary manipulation of a qubit. A measurement of the final quantum
state of the qubit gives the payoffs to the players. Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewen-
stein [2], while focussing on the concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) [3] from
noncooperative game theory, extended the famous game of prisoner’s dilemma
to quantum domain. Using a maximally entangled two-qubit initial quantum
state, they showed that the dilemma can be made to disappear when players
have access to a particular set of unitary operators. Also the classical game
can be reproduced as a subset. Later Marinatto and Weber [4] followed a dif-
ferent approach and studied the game of battle of sexes in quantum settings,
showing that the introduction of entangled strategies leads to a unique solution
of this game. Moreover, they showed that in their scheme the classical game
corresponds to an unentangled initial quantum state.
An important question in quantum game theory is to draw a comparison
with the corresponding classical version of the game. In classical game the-
ory there is well developed mathematical formalism to study the evolutionary
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dynamics of a population consisting of interacting individuals [5, 6]. It is inter-
esting to investigate and extend this formalism to quantum domain, and also
to compare the predictions of classical and quantum game-theoretical models of
evolution. In other words, how the established evolutionary concepts of math-
ematical biology, based on classical game-theoretical modeling, are modified by
the introduction of Hilbert space? In our earlier papers [7, 8, 9, 10] we explored
the relevance of the concept of evolutionary stability in quantum game theory.
In evolutionary game theory, an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) [11] is a
well known concept describing the stable states of a population resulting from
dynamics of evolution. ESSs are known to be symmetric Nash equilibria robust
against small mutations [12]. We explored how a strategy, being an ESS in clas-
sical version of the game, performs if the game is played in quantum settings.
Playing a game in Marinatto and Weber’s scheme [4] with particular choice of
initial quantum state, i.e., |ψini〉 = c11 |1, 1〉+ c22 |2, 2〉, where 1 and 2 represent
the classical pure strategies and |c11|
2 + |c22|
2 = 1 with c11, c22 ∈ C, we showed
that evolutionary stability of a pure strategy in a symmetric quantum form of
a bi-matrix game can be changed by a control on the parameters of the initial
quantum state [7, 8]. However, with an initial state in this form, the evolu-
tionary stability of a mixed NE cannot be changed for two-player games but it
becomes possible when the number of players is increased from two to three [9].
In these considerations the corresponding symmetric NE remain intact both in
the quantum and classical versions of the game.
In evolutionary game theory mixed strategies play a significant role. The
well-known Bishop-Cannings theorem (BCT) [13] describes an interesting prop-
erty of mixed ESSs in symmetric bi-matrix games. It is useful to introduce the
concept of support of an ESS to understand more easily the BCT [15, 14].
Suppose a strategy vector p = (pi) is an ESS. Its support S(p) is the set
S(p) = {i : pi > 0}. Thus the support of p is the set of pure strategies that can
be played by a p-player. BCT states that if p is an ESS with support I and r
6= p is an ESS with support J , then I + J . For bi-matrix games the BCT shows
that no pure strategy can be evolutionary stable when a mixed ESS exists [14].
Naturally one, then, asks about the classical pure ESSs when a switch-over to a
quantum form of a classical symmetric bi-matrix game also gives evolutionary
stability to a mixed symmetric NE.
In present paper, following an approach developed for the quantum version
of the rock-scissor-paper (RSP) game [10], we consider a general form of a
two-qubit initial quantum state. Our results show that for this form of initial
quantum state, the corresponding quantum version of a bi-matrix game can
give evolutionary stability to a mixed NE, when classically it is not stable. It
is interesting to observe that by ensuring evolutionary stability to a mixed NE
in a quantum form of the game, the BCT forces out the pure ESSs present in
classical form of the game.
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2 Evolutionary stability of a mixed NE
In a classical symmetric bi-matrix game, played in an evolutionary set-up in-
volving a population, all the members of the population are indistinguishable
and each individual is equally likely to face each other. In such a set-up one
assumes that individuals interact only in pair-wise encounters. Suppose that the
finite set of pure strategies {1, 2, ..., n} is available to each player. In one pair-
wise encounter let a player A receives a reward aij by playing strategy i against
another player B playing strategy j. In symmetric situation the player B, then,
gets aji as a reward. The value aij is an element in the n × n payoff matrix
M. We assume that the players also have an option to play a mixed strategy.
It means he/she plays the strategy i with probability pi for all i = 1, 2, ..., n. A
strategy vector p, with components pi, represents the mixed strategy played by
the player. In standard notation an average, or expected, payoff for player A,
playing strategy p, against player B playing q, is written as P (p,q) [14]
P (p,q) =
∑
aijpiqj = p
TMq (1)
where T is for transpose. Suppose that the strategy p is played by almost all
the members of the population, the rest of population forms a small mutant
group constituting a fraction ǫ of the total population playing q. p is said to be
evolutionary stable against q if
P [p, (1− ǫ)p+ǫq] > P [q, (1− ǫ)p+ǫq] (2)
for all sufficiently small ǫ. Thus p does better against the mean population
strategy than q does. The condition (2) implies that either (i) P (p,p) >P (q,p)
or (ii) P (p,p) =P (q,p) and P (p,q) >P (q,q). The vector p is said to be an
ESS if p is evolutionary stable against all q 6= p.
The payoff to a player in the quantum version of rock-scissors-paper (RSP)
game [10] can also be written in similar form to (1), provided the matrix M is
replaced with a matrix corresponding to the quantum version of the game. In
RSP each player has access to three pure strategies, represented by 1, 2, and 3,
and the game is given by the following matrix, with the players recognized as
Alice and Bob
Alice′s strategy
Bob’s strategy
1
2
3
1 2 3
 (α11, α11) (α12, α21) (α13, α31)(α21, α12) (α22, α22) (α23, α32)
(α31, α13) (α32, α23) (α33, α33)

 (3)
where, for example, (α23, α32) means that Alice and Bob get α23 and α32,
respectively, when Alice plays the strategy 2 and Bob plays 3. In quantum
version of the game the players apply unitary operators I, C, and D on an
initial quantum state defined as follows [4, 10]:
3
I |1〉 = |1〉 C |1〉 = |3〉 D |1〉 = |2〉
I |2〉 = |2〉 C |2〉 = |2〉 D |2〉 = |1〉
I |3〉 = |3〉 C |3〉 = |1〉 D |3〉 = |3〉 (4)
where C† = C = C−1 and D† = D = D−1 and I is the identity operator.
Suppose Alice applies the operators C, D, and I with the probabilities p, p1,
and (1 − p − p1), respectively. Similarly Bob applies the operators C, D, and
I with probabilities q, q1, and (1 − q − q1) respectively, on the initial quantum
state |ψini〉 where
|ψini〉 =
∑
i,j=1,2,3
cij |i, j〉 where
∑
i,j=1,2,3
|cij |
2
= 1 (5)
The payoff to Alice who plays the strategy p (where pT=[1− p− p1, p1, p])
against Bob who plays the strategy q (where qT=[1 − q − q1, q1, q]) can be
written as [10]
PA(p,q) = p
T
ωq (6)
where the matrix ω is given by
ω =

 ω11 ω12 ω13ω21 ω22 ω23
ω31 ω32 ω33

 (7)
and the elements of ω are given by following matrix equation
(
ω11 ω12 ω13 ω21 ω22 ω23 ω31 ω32 ω33
)
=
(
α11 α12 α13 α21 α22 α23 α31 α32 α33
)
×

|c11|
2
|c12|
2
|c13|
2
|c21|
2
|c22|
2
|c23|
2
|c31|
2
|c32|
2
|c33|
2
|c12|
2
|c11|
2
|c12|
2
|c22|
2
|c21|
2
|c22|
2
|c32|
2
|c31|
2
|c32|
2
|c13|
2
|c13|
2
|c11|
2
|c23|
2
|c23|
2
|c21|
2
|c33|
2
|c33|
2
|c31|
2
|c21|
2
|c22|
2
|c23|
2
|c11|
2
|c12|
2
|c13|
2
|c21|
2
|c22|
2
|c23|
2
|c22|
2
|c21|
2
|c22|
2
|c12|
2
|c11|
2
|c12|
2
|c22|
2
|c21|
2
|c22|
2
|c23|
2
|c23|
2
|c21|
2
|c13|
2
|c13|
2
|c11|
2
|c23|
2
|c23|
2
|c21|
2
|c31|
2
|c32|
2
|c33|
2
|c31|
2
|c32|
2
|c33|
2
|c11|
2
|c12|
2
|c13|
2
|c32|
2
|c31|
2
|c32|
2
|c32|
2
|c31|
2
|c32|
2
|c12|
2
|c11|
2
|c12|
2
|c33|
2
|c33|
2
|c31|
2
|c33|
2
|c33|
2
|c31|
2
|c13|
2
|c13|
2
|c11|
2


(8)
The above matrix (7) reduces to its classical form of Eq.(3), by making the
initial state unentangled i.e., |c11|
2
= 1.
In a symmetric game the exchange of strategies by Alice and Bob also ex-
changes their respective payoffs. The concept of an ESS was originally defined
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for symmetric games where a player’s payoff is given by his strategy and his
identity does not affect it [11, 6]. It is seen that the quantum game correspond-
ing to the matrix (3), when played using the initial quantum state of eq. (5),
becomes symmetric when
|cij |
2
= |cji|
2
for i 6= j (9)
Here the two-player quantum game, with three pure strategies, has a form sim-
ilar to a classical matrix game. The payoff matrix of the classical game is,
however, replaced now with its quantum version (7). Also the matrix (7) now
involves the coefficients cij of the initial quantum state (5).
To reduce the above mathematical formalism to two-players, two-strategy
quantum game let us fix p1 = q1 = 0, i.e., both players do not use the operator
D at all, and apply only the operators C and I, with classical probabilities, on
the initial quantum state. Payoff to the player who plays the strategy vector p
(where pT=[1− p p]) against the player playing the strategy vector q (where
qT=[1 − q q]) can again be written as P (p,q) = p
T
ωq. Nevertheless, ω is
now reduced to its simpler form given as
ω =
(
ω11 ω13
ω31 ω33
)
(10)
where the elements of the matrix are


ω11
ω13
ω31
ω33

 =


|c11|
2
|c13|
2
|c31|
2
|c33|
2
|c13|
2
|c11|
2
|c33|
2
|c31|
2
|c31|
2
|c33|
2
|c11|
2
|c13|
2
|c33|
2
|c31|
2
|c13|
2
|c11|
2




α11
α13
α31
α33

 (11)
It is now a bi-matrix game played with the initial quantum state (5). The
available pure strategies are now 1 and 3 only and the terms with subscripts
containing 2 disappear. Take x = 1 − p and y = 1 − q, so that x and y
are probabilities with which players apply identity operator on the initial state
|ψini〉. The strategy vectors p and q can then be represented only by the
numbers x and y, respectively. Payoff to a x-player against a y-player is obtained
as
P (x,y) = p
T
ωq =x {ω11y + ω13(1− y)}+ (1− x) {ω31y + ω33(1− y)} . (12)
Suppose (x⋆, x⋆) is a Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
P (x⋆, x⋆)− P (x, x⋆)
= (x⋆ − x) {x⋆(ω11 − ω13 − ω31 + ω33) + (ω13 − ω33)} ≥ 0 (13)
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for all x ∈ [0, 1]. The mixed strategy x⋆ = x⋆q =
ω33−ω13
ω11−ω13−ω31+ω33
makes the
payoff difference P (x⋆, x⋆) − P (x, x⋆) identically zero. The subscript q is for
‘quantum’. Let △x = x⋆ − x then
P (x⋆q , x)− P (x, x) = −(△x)
2 {ω11 − ω13 − ω31 + ω33} (14)
Now x⋆q is an ESS if
{
P (x⋆q , x) − P (x, x)
}
> 0 for all x 6= x⋆q [7, 8], which leads
to the requirement (ω11 − ω31 − ω13 + ω33) < 0.
The classical game corresponds when |c11|
2
= 1 and it gives ω11 = α11,
ω13 = α13, ω31 = α31, and ω33 = α33, in accordance with the Eq. (8). In
case (α11 − α13 − α31 + α33) > 0, the mixed NE of a classical game, i.e.,
x⋆ = x⋆c =
α33−α13
α11−α13−α31+α33
is not an ESS. Here the subscript c is for ‘classical’.
Since we are interested in a situation where evolutionary stability of a symmetric
NE changes –while the corresponding NE remains intact– in transforming the
game from classical to quantum form, lets take
x⋆c = x
⋆
q =
α33 − α13
α11 − α31 − α13 + α33
=
ω33 − ω13
ω11 − ω31 − ω13 + ω33
. (15)
saying that the classical NE x⋆c is also a NE in quantum form of the game. One
notices from the matrix in the Eq. (11)
(ω11 − ω31 − ω13 + ω33)
= (α11 − α13 − α31 + α33)(|c11|
2
− |c13|
2
− |c31|
2
+ |c33|
2
) (16)
and
ω33 − ω13 = |c11|
2
(α33 − α13) + |c13|
2
(α31 − α11) +
|c31|
2 (α13 − α33) + |c33|
2 (α11 − α31) (17)
Now a substitution from Eqs. (16,17) into the Eq. (15) gives α33 − α13 =
α11−α31, and this leads to x
⋆
c = x
⋆
q =
1
2
. Therefore, the mixed strategy x⋆ = 1
2
,
remain a NE in both classical and a quantum form of the game. Consider now
this mixed NE for a classical game with (α11 − α13 − α31 + α33) > 0 – showing
that it is not an ESS. The above Eq. (16) shows an interesting possibility that
it is still possible to have (ω11 − ω31 − ω13 + ω33) < 0 if
(|c11|
2
+ |c33|
2
) < (|c13|
2
+ |c31|
2
) (18)
In other words, now the evolutionary stability of a mixed strategy –which is
a NE in both classical and quantum versions of the game– changes when the
game switches-over between its two forms. To have a symmetric game in its
quantum form one also needs |c13|
2
= |c31|
2
and the inequality (18) reduces to
|c11|
2 + |c33|
2
< |c13|
2 + |c31|
2.
Therefore, a quantum version of a symmetric bi-matrix classical game of the
matrix
(
(α11, α11) (α13, α31)
(α31, α13) (α33, α33)
)
(19)
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can be played by players having two unitary operators and a general two-qubit
quantum state of the form
|ψini〉 =
∑
i,j=1,3
cij |ij〉 (20)
where
∑
i,j=1,3
|cij |
2
= 1. In case α33 − α13 = α11 − α31 the mixed strategy
x⋆ = 1
2
is not an ESS in the classical game if (α33−α13) > 0. Nevertheless, the
strategy x⋆ = 1
2
becomes an ESS when |c11|
2
+ |c33|
2
< |c13|
2
+ |c31|
2
. In case
(α33 − α13) < 0 the strategy x
⋆ = 1
2
is an ESS classically but does not remain
if |c11|
2
+ |c33|
2
< |c13|
2
+ |c31|
2
. Now suppose |c13|
2
= |c31|
2
= 0. Then the Eq.
(16) reduces to
(ω11 − ω13 − ω31 + ω33) = (α11 − α13 − α31 + α33) (21)
One observes from the above equation that if a quantum game is played by
following simple form of the initial quantum state
|ψini〉 = c11 |11〉+ c33 |33〉 (22)
it is not possible to influence the evolutionary stability of a mixed NE, as it is
concluded in our earlier work [8, 9].
3 Summary
Mixed ESSs appear in many games of interest that are played in the natural
world. The examples of the Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) and the Hawks and
Doves games are well known from evolutionary game theory. In evolutionary
game theory the Bishop-Cannings theorem does not permit pure ESSs when a
mixed ESS exists in a bi-matrix game. In earlier work [7, 8, 9, 10] we showed
that it is possible to change evolutionary stability of a pure symmetric NE
with a control of the parameters c11 and c22 when the game is played with an
initial two-qubit quantum state of the form |ψini〉 = c11 |1, 1〉+ c22 |2, 2〉 where
|c11|
2
+ |c22|
2
= 1. However, evolutionary stability of a mixed symmetric NE
cannot be changed with such a control. In this paper, following the approach
developed for the quantum version of the rock-scissor-paper (RSP) game [10],
we allowed the game to be played with a general form of a two-qubit initial
quantum state. With this state it becomes possible to change evolutionary
stability of a mixed NE. For a bi-matrix game we worked out a symmetric
mixed NE that remains intact in both the classical and quantum versions of the
game. For this mixed NE we, then, found conditions making it possible that
evolutionary stability of a mixed symmetric NE changes with a switch-over of
the game between its two forms, one classical and the other quantum.
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